Showing posts with label Speech and Remarks. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Speech and Remarks. Show all posts

Wednesday, 10 May 2017

THIS IS TO INFORM YOU THAT BPSR BLOG HAS MOVED. cc @DrJoeAbah

The Director-General of Bureau of Public Services Reform had promised Nigerians that its blogging activities which were launched on this platform would eventually be moved over to its website, over at BPSR.


We are delighted to inform you that we have moved our blogging activities over to our website at

http://bpsr.gov.ng/index.php/media-center/blog/item/3-an-interview-with-dr-joe-abah-nigerian-government-committed-to-ogp


We thank you for the visit and encourage you to visit us over at our website.

KINDLY CLICK BPSR BLOG TO VISIT US.

Thursday, 27 April 2017

@DrJoeAbah, DG BPSR Discusses 'Governance In Nigeria' on AIT's program - Focus Nigeria.

The DG, Bureau of Public Service Reforms, Dr Joe Abah appeared on AIT's News program, Focus Nigeria where he answered questions from live tweets on how difficult it is to run a compact government, reduce the size of government and have an efficient civil service. 
 

Wednesday, 5 April 2017

NCC is the best-managed agency we've assessed...so far says @DrJoeAbah, DG, BPSR

Dr Joe Abah of BPSR and Prof. Umar Garba Danbatta of NCC
The Nigerian Communications Commission has been rated the best public sector organisation in Nigeria by the Bureau for Public Service Reforms (BPSR).

This is the outcome of a sequence of validation assessments of NCC alongside all Federal public sector organisations in Nigeria.

Having scored above 90 percent in the assessment, Prof. Umar Garba Danbatta, EVC/CEO of NCC received the PLATINUM Level award on behalf of the Board and Management of NCC from Dr Joe Abah, Director General of BPSR.

“NCC performance was rated as far exceeding expectations due to an exceptional high quality of work in all essential areas of responsibility resulting in an overall quality of work that was found to be superior, exceptional and unique.

“We are pleased to forward this certificate to NCC, DrAbah said as he presented the award to Prof. Danbatta.

(NEWS GURU)

Monday, 27 March 2017

Online Application for Driver's License in Nigeria is LIVE. cc @DrJoeAbah

https://www.nigeriadriverslicence.org/dlApplication/renew

In the spirit of the continuous revamping of processes of public ventures and ease of making transactions which has seen the Nigerian Immigration service launch a 48-hour online visa application system for businesspersons, the Federal Road Safety Corp has introduced a new and easier way of requesting and renewing driver’s license in all the states of the federation.

The improved means which was announced by the Director-General of Bureau of Public Service, Dr Joe Abah through his Twitter handle (@DrJoeAbah) has the official costs of a driver’s license at 6,350 Naira for 3 years validity and 10,450 naira for 5 years validity.

Explaining the costs and the process, Dr Joe Abah stated the price above is solely for the license and not for any other thing. In essence, the process may incur other expenses which are by no means catered for in the 6,350, and 10,450 price groups respectively.

First-time applicants are expected, as a norm, to have gone through driving school where they must have taken driving tests and issued certificates of proficiency which will allow them to apply for the license. All costs incurred during this process are not covered by the license fee.

Dr Abah explained further that it is possible for Vehicle Inspection Officers who control the issuance of driving certificates at states level to charge certain amounts on certificates, which vary per states for driving certificates, different from the license fee.

The state internal revenues board may also charge certain amounts for each license. This also varies by state. Taking driving lessons and tests are the normal procedure for the procurement of a driving license. The will to fraudulently bypass this process is taken as the main reason some applicants pay touts and fake officers double the stipulated fees.

The process for renewal is similar to that of new applicants except for the tests and certificates. For renewals and new applications, motorists are to log on to www.nigeriadriverslicence.org where they would initiate their renewal and pay the appropriate fees. The data page is then to be printed and taken to the nearest FRSC office for the necessary confirmations and affirmations.

In all this, however, the interesting part is that the application can now be self-initiated, with only minor confirmations, certifications, and tests to be completed at the branches of the Federal Road Service Corp. This will not only fast-track the process of applying for a license, it blocks, to an extent, avenues for corrupt officials to extort Nigerians.

(Ventures Africa)

Saturday, 25 March 2017

Two of Africa's Biggest Fallacies - "Planning is not our problem. Africans are unable to implement" by @DrJoeAbah

“Success depends upon previous preparation, and without such preparation there is sure to be failure” [Confucius]
Everywhere you go in Africa, you are likely to hear people say “Our problem is not planning, but implementation.” People regale you with various examples of “beautiful plans” that were “technically perfect” but never made it to implementation. Indeed, the refrain “Our problem is not planning but implementation” receives knowing nods of approval from all and sundry and is generally taken as accepted wisdom. It is likely to win you loud ovation at any workshop or seminar in Africa. You could be forgiven for thinking that Africans are born with a deficiency of the implementation gene if there was such a thing. The statement that planning is not our problem and the notion that Africans are unable to implement are two of the biggest fallacies there are.

The statement that planning is not our problem and the notion that Africans are unable to implement are two of the biggest fallacies there are.


For donors by donors

Let us start with planning. There are five main types of plan prevalent in Africa. The first type is “donor plans”: plans written for the benefit of donors. Actually, if the truth be told, they are usually plans written by donors for donors in the name of Africans. From Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, to Structural Adjustment Programmes, to Millennium Development Goals, even to the current Sustainable Development Goals – very few of these plans enjoy top-level government ownership or even, in some cases, awareness.

There is often no link to government budgets; no consideration of implementation capacity; and no consideration of institutions and politics. Worse still, purist monitoring and evaluation practitioners virtually force people to promise things they know full well will not happen, just so that the logical framework can be technically perfect. Even the few plans that are “costed” are usually costed by people who do not have basic information about government fiscal policies, unit costs, availability of resources or workable sequence. Is it, therefore, any surprise that many of these plans are never implemented? Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?

The second type of plan prevalent in Africa is what I would term the “advocacy plan”. These are plans that are intended to be used to put pressure on government to behave in a different way. Most of Africa’s sector plans fall into this category. Sector experts in areas like health and education are rightly passionate about improvements in their field, but are usually blissfully unaware of the pressures on other arms of government. They will write an education or health sector plan which cannot be fully funded even if a country was to spend its entire budget on it to the exclusion of everything else.

When you say to them: “We currently have 100 students to one teacher. Can we first plan to get to 85 students to one teacher over the next two years?” they will say “No! The ‘Education For All’ standard is 30 students to one teacher and we must maintain pressure on the government to build more classrooms and engage more teachers.” I approximate with the figures, but you get the gist. When you then ask them where the money should come from to pay for it and still fund security, infrastructure and other priorities, they will usually say that those sectors too should fight for their own resources, as if the resource envelope is endlessly elastic. Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?

God forbid!

The third type of plan is the “Plan A Only” plan. The Twitter profile of one Charles Mwabili says “No Plan B – it distracts Plan A.” Yep! You guessed it. He’s African. We have several versions of this type of plan across Africa. Each is usually preceded by good analysis and has at least made an effort to be realistic. However, there is usually no risk analysis, no risk mitigation and no contingency planning. Any questions such as “What if something were to go wrong?” are often met with no more than “God will not let it happen.” Well, Murphy’s law is that whatever can go wrong will. And God lets earthquakes, tsunamis and famines happen. So, with these plans, the moment something does not happen as planned, or happens out of sequence (as life generally tends to do), the plan is immediately thrown into disarray. If you are lucky, aspects of it will be implemented but usually in a haphazard way. Instead of having a Plan B to build a smaller house, given a fall in revenue, the money for the roof of the planned big house gets cut. It never gets built and ends up as an abandoned project. Is not having a Plan B an implementation problem or a planning problem?

In the eye of the beholder

The “beautiful plan” looks technically perfect and ticks all the boxes, but is completely unrealistic.

The fourth type of plan is the “beautiful plan”. This type of plan looks technically perfect and ticks all the boxes, but is completely unrealistic. It is hailed as the answer to all Africa’s problems and is the type of plan that evokes the most anger when it is not implemented. It plans to pave every street with gold, in a country that has no gold and no money to buy any. The beautiful plan will give everybody an immediate 1000% percent pay rise. It will turn the worst slums into Dubai or Singapore overnight, of course without the need for an autocratic ruler and other institutional conditions. It pretends that politics does not exist, that people do not have self-interest and that everyone’s priorities are uniform. Sometimes, the plan is prepared on a ceteris paribus – all other things being equal – basis and assumes that all projected revenue will come in, all budgeted funds will be fully released, and that the required human resource capacity and capability already exist in abundance. Indeed, it assumes that the common sense of it all should be so blindingly obvious that the plan should just deliver itself. After all, it has happened exactly as planned in other countries. Sorry to bastardise the phrase but ceteris is never paribus, particularly in Africa. Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?

The fire brigade

The fifth type of plan is, of course, the “fire brigade plan.” This is the type that was written only to facilitate the theft of public funds from donors or the government itself. It is usually cobbled together shoddily and quickly at the eleventh hour, and only a little intellectual prodding is sufficient to expose its soft underbelly. Fire brigade plans see African countries unable to cater for their athletes during Olympic Games and World Cups. Although we have four years notice that these events will happen, we do not start to plan for them until a few months before the start date. There is little or no preparation, arrangements to take care of athletes at host cities are shoddy, and their allowances are not paid or have been misappropriated. In truth, it would appear that there was never at any time an intention that what was planned would be implemented. Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?


The good plan

A good plan will have a deep understanding of political economy: the way it is, not the way it ought to be.

A good plan is a plan that has a good chance of getting delivered. A plan that has no chance of getting delivered is a bad plan. There is, therefore, no such thing as a “beautiful plan” that does not get delivered. “Beautiful plans” are bad plans. A good plan will factor in resources (human and financial), in a realistic manner based on historical patterns. It will not be based on the pipe dream that internally generated revenue will somehow magically double overnight. Funds for Year 1 will not be based on income from a mining programme that hasn’t even been commissioned, let alone being at break even or making profit. A good plan will have a deep understanding of political economy: the way it is, not the way it ought to be. It will have a best case, middle case, and worst case scenario, based on realistic projections for policy, personnel and funds. It will identify a number of quick wins that are virtually cost-free to buy support and build confidence. Finally, a good plan will have an implementation plan that factors in all the risks to its own implementation! This will include rigorous analysis of risks that accepts some of the risks as unmanageable “show-stoppers”, but also identifies those that can be managed and mitigated (and sets out clear steps for doing so). How many of Africa’s plans are good plans?

The implementation gene

Let us now come to implementation. Are Africans born deficient of an “implementation gene”? Of course not; Africans can implement as well as everyone else. However, there is a science to implementation. One of the foremost advocates of what he calls “deliverology” is Sir Michael Barber, author of the book 'Instruction To Deliver.' In essence, he talks about the need to set clear priorities and measurable goals, use data and trajectories to drive progress, build routines around priorities, focus on solving problems and build relentless persistence in tracking the priorities. He also suggests setting up a dedicated unit to manage delivery. Africans are quick to set up units and a number of countries have already set up delivery units. The extent to which these can function without better planning remains to be seen. Barber’s approach is actually not that difficult to follow, particularly if there is a plan and the political will to implement that plan. Often, the basic plan is missing.

Of course, corruption is an impediment to implementation, as are capacity constraints, politics, funding, geography, ethnicity and religion. I must give religion a special mention as a major impediment to implementation in Africa, given the number of tasks that we should ordinarily perform but would rather delegate upwards to God. In my view, it is possible to blame the high level of religiousness in Africa for a lot of the weak risk management. However, none of these is as big an impediment as poor planning and an absence of preparation. Why would God not let us fail at the Olympics if we are busy wrangling over ethnic issues when others are busy preparing for the Games?

Ready, steady, go!

The Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt made GBP£5 million per second at the 2016 Rio Olympics. Let that sink in, please. PER SECOND! But here’s what is important: in order to achieve that level of income he lifted weights for four hours every day and practised his sprinting every day for 15 years, BEFORE he arrived in Rio. He was not punishing himself in training in order to please donors. He was not punishing himself in order to make anyone else perform differently. As he prepared to be a sprinter, he also readied himself to be a footballer or a cricketer, in case he did not make it at sprinting. The good thing about sports is that it makes you be true to yourself. Your success as a competitor will often depend on whether or not you can overcome your own limitations. In the world of sports, you cannot have a “beautiful plan” to run the 100 metres in under 10 seconds within six months when your weak knees mean that you have never even walked 10 metres in your life without pain, and probably never will. Finally, Usain Bolt did not start preparing for Rio three months before the Games – he started 15 years ago. That is why he never had an implementation problem in Rio.


If we are going to get better at implementation, Africa really must get better at planning and preparation. Of course, Usain Bolt is also blessed with great natural attributes – but Africa is blessed with even more.

Article originally published in African Research Institute Blog.

By Dr Joe Abah is Director-General of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms, The Presidency, Nigeria, and a Visiting Lecturer at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, The Netherlands.

Monday, 20 March 2017

Why do Nigerian public servants do everything to avoid retiring from their positions, asks @DrJoeAbah.


No, not me! I certainly don’t!! Rather, this post seeks to unravel something that, to many people, is a mystery: Why do Nigerian public servants do everything to avoid retiring from their positions, while public servants in other countries are holding protests to LOWER the retirement age?

Indeed, Nigerian public servants have been known to falsify their ages just to stay on in office. For some, if you follow their employment records closely, they would have graduated from university at the age of 2 years old! I know there are child geniuses, but these are rather rare, and these people tend not to be geniuses in any sense of the word.

Public service pay in Nigeria is unrealistically low, especially below the Permanent Secretary or Director-General pay rates. An honest Nigerian public servant that has worked continuously for 30 years will have great difficulty being able to afford to build a house or even buy a brand new car.

They cannot withstand economic shocks, such as a death in the family or even an increase in rent. Also, as people age, the appetite to continue going to work day-in-day-out, negotiating the traffic and dealing with criticisms from the public, starts to wane. So why do they want to stay on in office when they can retire and get a pension?

I would argue that there are four main reasons: Economics, Influence, Uncertainty, and Ability.

Let us start with the Economics. 
You see, the money you make as a public servant is made on the job, not when you are retired. I will distinguish between legitimate additional income and corrupt enrichment. Although non-initiates will attribute any extra salary income a public servant gets to corruption, this is not at all true.

First of all, and for the avoidance of doubt, let me quickly put to bed the notion that senior public servants have everything paid for.

That is no longer the case. Before 2007, as a Director-General, I would have been entitled to live in a government mansion in the most expensive part of town, drive a fleet of government vehicles (maybe even have one allocated to my wife, with a government driver in tow), have a cook, a night watchman (security man) and even a gardener. This stopped in 2007 with what is called the “Monetisation Policy.” This consolidated everything into a single salary, which means that if I want a cook, I would have to pay them out of my salary.

The Monetisation Policy led to an increase in salaries in 2007, but the value of the pay rise did not come anywhere close to the benefits that public servants enjoyed, even at a lower salary rate before it came into force. It, therefore, made massive savings for government and reduced the cost of maintenance of house, cars and other perks. However, some perks remained that could cushion the effects a little bit, particularly for the most senior public servants, from Director upwards.

Let me explain, using just two activities: Travel and Training. You see, as a Director-General, I am ENTITLED to $600 per night for any night that I spend outside Nigeria on official duty.

Therefore, if I am away for just 5 days every month on official assignment, I am entitled to claim $3,000 from the government every month. This is perfectly legitimate, and, at current rates, will amount to a salary supplementation of nearly N1.5 million Naira per month. Added to my salary, that makes a big difference, and the best bit is that it is completely legitimate!

Of course, some people abused this and, as soon as they are appointed, some would designate a Technical/ Special Assistant, one of who’s primary assignments is to scour the world for conferences and seminars. If I were to be away for 10 days every month, that would be $6,000 or N3 million per month at current exchange rates. No wonder you would never find me “on seat.”

Is it any wonder then that in 2013, the Federal Government spent N100 billion (22% of total Overhead expenditure) on Travel and N56 billion (12% of total Overhead expenditure) on Training? Now, you wouldn’t have the opportunity to supplement your pension in this way once you leave office, would you? Elementary really. Before you get too excited, that avenue has now all but closed.

Early in 2015, the government announced a policy banning foreign training and severely restricting foreign travel. Except for limited, specialised, training that is not available in-country, all trainers must now come to Nigeria. Also, aside from statutory meetings of international bodies like OPEC and the World Trade Organisation, attendance at all conferences must now be fully funded by whoever is inviting you, AND be at no cost to the government! This singular policy cut even the requests for permission to travel out of the country by something like 70%.

Having looked at legitimate extra earnings, let us now look briefly at illegitimate ones. Of course, the privilege to award contracts and dispense patronage brings huge financial returns. If you are in a “juicy” ministry, department or agency, and are so minded, you are likely not to even know how much your salary really is, as it is likely to be going straight to your wife as “food money.” You see, a pensioner does not have contracts to award or patronage to dispense. Why would anybody want to retire?

The introduction of the Public Procurement Act in 2007 again made things more difficult than they were before. Of course, there is still patronage and corruption, but impunity has reduced. Better budgeting, with things like the Zero-Based Budgeting system and increased scrutiny by members of the public, using instruments such as the Freedom of Information Act, 2011, tightened things up further. The recent Whistleblower Policy (with financial incentives) will ratchet up the pressure even more.

Let’s next look at Influence. 
A senior government official can walk into virtually any office unannounced and without an appointment. They are likely to be seen even by a DG or Permanent Secretary because their visit is likely to relate to an official matter that may even benefit the senior official. When a pensioner comes to see a government official, they are likely to be looking for some help or the other, and the visit is unlikely to be of any benefit to the public official. It is a one-way relationship, and they are likely to be made to wait for long hours in the waiting room. Sometimes, they will wait the whole day and the boss will go home and even forget that they are waiting. Who would want to be a pensioner?

The third factor is Uncertainty. 
You see, before the Pensions Reform Act, 2004, Nigeria operated a non-contributory pension system for public servants. This meant that, upon retirement, you were entitled to a pension. Whether you actually receive it at any time before you die was another matter. As at 2004 when the Act was passed, the Federal Government had a Pensions deficit of N43 billion. Who would want to retire into a life of uncertainty and likely penury? Better to forge a birth certificate or swear to an affidavit of age and pay someone to substitute the lower age with the one that was in your file.

The introduction of the Contributory Pensions Scheme has reduced that uncertainty. Now, you at least know you will receive a pension, as the pension pot is currently standing at more than N5 trillion in credit. Of course, challenges remain, including the fact that it can take up to a year from when you retire to start receiving a pension. The government is working hard to address this issue now. For the avoidance of doubt, Ministers, Directors-General and Executive Secretaries do not get a pension. Permanent Secretaries and other public servants do.

The final factor is Ability. 
This affects civil servants more than other public servants. Let me illustrate with a Permanent Secretary friend of mine that was disengaged by the government late in 2015. I called to commiserate and, fighting back tears, he asked me: “Joe, what am I going to do now? I don’t know how to do anything other than being a civil servant!” I think his question and statement sums it up, nicely but painfully. Unfortunately, public servants allowed themselves to be seduced by the idea of a job-for-life and did not bother to learn any other skills. Alas, even a Permanent Secretary is now no longer permanent!

As things are progressively tightened up in terms of budgeting, procurement, and the use of overhead expenditure for things like travel and training, the incentives for staying on reduce. Even age falsification is much more difficult than before, particularly with biometrics in the payroll system, a continuous audit of personnel and the link of payroll to bank verification numbers. Even creating ghost workers as a “side deal” is getting harder and harder. The current anticorruption war also means that people take far less risk now that they did before. The more likely you are to go to jail for what used to be little money, the less cavalier you will be with public funds. Suddenly, retirement to the safety of your family, with a guaranteed pension, begins to look like an attractive option.

However, as the avenues to obtain even legitimate extra-salary income close one after the other, it would be important to review public service pay, as soon as biometric payroll is extended to the entire public service and the incidence of ghost workers have been reduced to a minimum. It is unrealistic to expect a director to live on less than N300,000 per month, after putting in 33 years of service.

Of course, the government already spends too much on itself, relative to the rest of the population, and there is a need to reduce the cost of governance. The simplistic solution of some is “sack them all.” It will take a brave politician to take this step, and there is every likelihood that another government will simply reverse it as soon as they come in and recall everyone that had been sacked, for cheap popularity.

Nigeria has recent experience in this regard. A majority of those disengaged in 2006/2007 found their way back into the system as soon as there was a change of government. For those that didn't, the Bureau of Public Service Reforms is in court several times a week with people who were disengaged in 2007, have collected and spent their disengagement benefits, and are now taking us to court asking to be reinstated 10 years later! During my tenure as Director-General, we have thankfully, not lost a single one of those cases in court.

It is perhaps more sensible to adopt a gradual, but deliberate, approach that cuts the number of agencies and parastatals, finds money to incentivise people to go early (and not replace them) and deploys a robust performance management system to clear out corrupt, incompetent, deadwood. These are political decisions for which robust technical approaches can be put in place to ensure that they are properly done.

Dr Joe Abah, DG BPSR

Unless serious debates about these issues come to the fore of our consciousness as a public service, people will simply find new ways to make ends meet, given rising inflation and galloping costs of living. 

Even those that want, to be honest, and forthright will come under increasing pressure. People will be even more fearful of retirement, particularly as pensions, for most, represent a 30% cut even on the already low wages. Better to just find a way to die on the seat!

MEDIUM

Article by Dr Joe Abah, Director-General, Bureau of Public Service Reforms, The Presidency, Nigeria 

Monday, 13 March 2017

“Oga you can’t just write “Not Approved” na. Ok Oga, how much you wan approve? - ”Budget Padding 101: For Beginners by @DrJoeAbah


Dr Joe Abah
Every good “intellekshual” article should start with definitions. I’m afraid that, having said that, it’s all downhill from here on in. That’s because the term “budget padding” means different things to different people. However, we will start with the basics and take it from there, and see whether we can make some sense of this topic.

You see, when someone is appointed a Director-General, Executive Secretary or Permanent Secretary in Nigeria, it is a big deal that is sometimes celebrated with congratulatory advertisements in major newspapers. It is an achievement, not a call to service and sacrifice. To bring this home to you, when I was appointed DG, I remember complaining that my salary was not processed for the first 3 months and I didn’t know how to meet my bills. A senior civil servant looked at me, laughed and remarked: “See Oga o. You don’t know what God has done for you!” You see, as a Director-General. Executive Secretary or Permanent Secretary, you are an “Accounting Officer” and the way that government resources are expended is almost entirely within your gift. “What do you mean you don’t have money? Smh!”

With this mentality ingrained in the mind of the public servant, your officers then propose things to you that have monetary implications. Now, there is a practice of Accounting Officers cutting the money that their officers ask for. It looks good in the files because any auditor can see that you have at least made an effort to be prudent. The public servants know this, so they will “beef up” the proposals to give the Accounting Officer something to cut. When knowing that you bought 20 CD-Roms and flash disks just last week, you cut those out as being necessary, un-budgeted-for or inflated, and you write “Not Approved”, the haggling begins. “Oga you can’t just write “Not Approved” na. Ok Oga, how much you wan approve?” If you were in Wuse Market, the question would be: “Oya, how much you wan pay?”

The first definition of “budget padding” is then when officers inflate the costs of an activity, in the expectation that the Accounting Officer will cut it. Let’s call this “Budget Padding Type 1.”

Let’s go one level up. In the recent past, the Budget Office was also thought to have the same mentality. Whatever the Accounting Officer proposes, the Budget Office will cut it, whether or not it makes sense. Therefore, you could have a situation where the money approved is simply insufficient to deliver the activity. Rather than asking you to “build a smaller house”, they will cut the proposal such that you cannot do the decking or roof the building. Knowing this, many Accounting Officers similarly “beefed up” the cost, in the hope that when the budget is inevitably cut, they will at least have enough to deliver the project. Therefore, the second definition of “budget padding” is when the Accounting Officer “beefs up” the cost of a project in the expectation that the Budget Office will cut it. Let’s call this Type 2.

Even when costs are cut to a reasonable size, don’t forget that releases do not always come. For instance, during 2016, only 9 months of overheads was released and the first release of overheads for 2017 only happened in March 2017. By then, Accounting Officers were owing something like 6 months of arrears for things like cleaning, diesel and stationery. Knowing this then, many Accounting Officers will budget for 12 months but actually realistically plan for 9 months worth of releases. It would, therefore, be prudent, when preparing next year’s budget, to plan to pay all your bills with 9 months worth of releases, rather than 12 months. If you like, you could define this as “Budget Padding Type 3.”

Different people take different routes to address this problem. BPSR chose to go and do speak “turenci” and do a presentation to the Budget Office, so that they can understand its work. Others went to beg in advance, and yet others relied on “personal contacts” in the Budget Office. This was the crazy system we had as at 2015. I will return to this presently.

The highest level up is when the budget proposal gets to the National Assembly. You see, it is the National Assembly that appropriates. All that the Executive submits is Budget Estimates. This is where it gets tricky. NASS members argue that they have a right to “insert” projects in the budget where they feel that the Executive has not done enough to reflect “the aspirations of the people” in the budget submitted. They, therefore, “insert appropriate projects” in the budget. While these should be within the overall resource envelope submitted by the Executive, it often isn’t and any increases are often expected to be funded with increases in the oil benchmark prices or upward adjustments to the exchange rate used by the Executive.

The rigorous macroeconomic modelling that the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Commission used to arrive at the resource envelope is ignored. This is why various Presidents have refused to assent to the Budgets submitted to them by NASS. As time passes, they are under pressure from the public to sign. Therefore, in order not to plunge the government into further debt, the Budget Office chose what to fund and what not to fund, to checkmate the possibility of Accounting Officers approaching NASS to “positively influence” their budgets. Is this “Budget Padding Type 4” or “Insertions”?

The scenarios I outlined above is what happened with the 2016 “Budget Padding Saga.” It is for this reason that a number of officers in the Budget Office were removed and sanctioned following the 2016 debacle. You see, every effort had been made to break away from the past and produce a realistic budget, at least on the part of the Executive, with the introduction of the “Zero-Based Budget” (ZBB). The ZBB approach required Accounting Officers to justify every item of Capital expenditure, first to the Budget Office and the Ministry of Budget and Planning, and then to NASS. Unfortunately, some officers in the Budget Office thought they could go back to “business as usual.” This is why Accounting Officers whose budgets looked higher than what was submitted by the Executive were asked to explain the difference. Some could. Others couldn’t and were shown the door.

For the 2017 Budget, efforts were made to sanitise the Budget Office. That Office had 4 Directors-General in a 2 year period. For this year’s Budget, Accounting Officers were invited to bilateral talks to explain and justify their proposals in detail. Only what made sense was admitted into the Budget. To do so, Accounting Officers had to build up Capital costs from various linked templates. In some cases, the templates gave you fixed costs for things like lunch and tea break for conferences. The fixed costs were supplied by the Efficiency Unit of the the Federal Ministry of Finance. This is why the DG of the Budget Office could confidently declare recently that, from the side of the Executive, there was no padding in the 2017 Budget. He is likely to be right.

Budget Efforts are underway to introduce more fixed costs by collating the standard prices known by the Budget Office, the Presidential Initiative on Continuous Audit (for Personnel Costs) and the Bureau of Public Procurement (for goods and services and things like vehicles). The BPP database currenty has 22,000 items of standard costs but this has not yet been linked to the Budget template in the same was as refreshments were linked from the Efficiency Unit. We expect that the system will improve further for the 2018 Budget, particularly when we also introduce the ZBB approach to Recurrent items, not just Capital.

The budgeting system that we ran in Nigeria until recently was, in effect, a farce. The Capital component has improved, although no one can say it is now perfect. At least, there has been some improvement. Better estimation, using standard costs, will virtually eliminate the incidence of “budget padding” on the part of the Executive. “Insertions” by the National Assembly will be reduced by early consultations with NASS as to what should go into the Budgets of each Ministry, Department and Agency. This will give Nigeria a realistic budget, based on realistically available resources and government policy priorities. This is where government is going. It is determined to get there.

Originally Published in MEDIUM

Tuesday, 7 March 2017

‘Ageing’ Europe Needs African Migrants' - Read how BPSR's DG @DrJoeAbah made the International news.

European Union (EU) Ambassador to Nigeria Michel Arrion has reportedly said that Europe’s “ageing population” means the continent needs to open up legal channels for Africans to migrate.
Mr. Arrion, who heads the EU’s delegation to Nigeria, made this claim at the country’s Bureau of Public Service Reforms, according to tweets published by the government agency’s director general, Dr. Joe Abah.

The Ambassador declared that Europe “must support properly-regulated immigration from Africa” after making comments which made mention of his West African host’s astronomic birth rate, Abah said.

Mr. Arrion has made similar statements in the past. In 2015, at a conference on migration policy in Abuja, Mr. Arrion stated that the EU welcomes migration because the continent needs “fresh blood”. According to the ambassador, immigration “enhances the movement of factors of production, particularly labour, especially in Europe”.

He continued: “Migration is good. We [Europe] like migration as long as it is legal. We need migration for various reasons. Movement of factors of production is a good thing and labour moving freely is a very good thing.

“In Europe and in other western countries, we have this specific issue of aging population. So we need fresh blood in our countries.”

Mr. Arrion cautioned against the phenomenon of brain drain, however, noting that “there are more PhD holders from Nigerian origin in Europe or in America than in Nigeria.”

Last summer, the European Commission unveiled plans to massively increase legal migration from Africa with a relaunched ‘Blue Card’ scheme to make Europe “more attractive” to people from the world’s poorest continent.

Last month, the UN-backed International Organisation for Migration’s Europe director said Africans seek a “decent livelihood” — which they are unable to find in their homelands — and so EU nations should provide them with jobs.

Declaring Africans’ desire to move to Europe a “legitimate aspiration”, Eugenio Ambrosi said Europe must open channels allowing them to migrate legally if Brussels wants to cut deaths in the Mediterranean.

(BREITBART LONDON)

Monday, 27 February 2017

Africa Has Too Many Pilots, None Of Them Taking Off! – by @DrJoeAbah (Agree or Disagree)

Dr Joe Abah
No! Not aircraft pilots, donor pilot projects. The world of development is littered with “pilots.” Demonstration projects that show it can be done. We know that with donor funding, donor expertise, discrete initiatives and clearly defined “results” certain things can work in developing countries. We know that! Doing new pilots do not tell us anything new.

The question is: do donor pilot projects lead to “organic diffusion? Does doing demonstration projects lead to systemic changes in institutions. By Institutions, we mean the way that things are done in a society. This is to be distinguished from Organisations (groups of people intentionally put together to achieve a set purpose).

Institutions are conditioned by history, sociology, culture and politics. They are the socially accepted norms that are practiced by society and handed down to successive generations through education and socialization. These include marriage, tradition, morals and ethical values. Accepted wisdom is that institutions take a long time to shift, sometimes as long as a whole generation or 40 years. Of course, there are occasions where institutions have changed more quickly. This often happens through a process of dislocation, where the normal rhythm of institutions is upset for the greater good. How can we get more dislocation in areas where we urgently need it?

I argue that this tends to happen in cases where there is an imperative to bring about change; that imperative is backed by the power to make the necessary changes; and there is altruistic patriotism to bring about a new order.

You see, reformers generally tend to pursue three, often distinct, approaches to institutional change. The first approach can be loosely termed the “big bang” approach. With this approach, the reformer develops a plan to pursue change in the key areas of planning, budgeting and delivery in priority areas, and complements this with relentless monitoring and evaluation, using feedback from citizens to close the loop and recalibrate interventions. While this approach is holistic, it can often suffer from over-ambition and a loss of focus. It also requires very strong political will, which is often lacking in developing countries. This approach succeeded in the United Kingdom where Tony Blair became perhaps the only recent global politician to have campaigned, and won elections, on a manifesto of public service reforms.

The second main approach is what Professor Matt Andrews of Harvard University termed the “Problem-Driven Iterative Approach.” With this approach, you focus on one major problem at a time. You solve that problem (and all the problems embedded within it, with the expected back and forth) and move on to the next problem. This approach suffers the risk that you could be stuck on one seemingly intractable problem for ever and take your eyes off other balls. For instance, most people agree that stable electricity is a key catalyst for development. However, it is rather difficult and slow to change the institutions (the way things are done) around electricity, particularly where there are strong opposing interests and a consistent failure to productively invest in electricity infrastructure for generations.

The third main approach is pilots, the donor darlings. Pilots are usually demonstration projects that show “the natives” that things are possible, usually followed by an expectation that once this is made clear to them, they would simply adopt the lessons more widely and solve all remaining problems. Do donor demonstration projects have a track record of bringing about institutional change? I argue that they do not. Donor pilot projects tend to be advocacy projects. They tend to demonstrate that, given certain conditions, some things can work differently. We know that! What precisely is the point of doing more and more pilots? The danger with pilots is that they can often ignore the institutional factors that constrain change in the first place. They beg the question: why does it take donor funding and expertise (using locals) to make some things work? Why do they not work without donor involvement? For those that work, why do they stop working when donor involvement ends?

Africa is littered with several of these pilots and demonstration projects. From solar-powered boreholes, to rural electrification schemes, to skills acquisition schemes, to improved processes for licensing. I could go on and on. They often work for some time, achieve the “success” that donors can report to their funders back home and are them swiftly abandoned when the donor programme ends. Many are designed without much thought as to the recurrent implications of maintaining them and without regard to the institutional changes in planning, budgeting, project management, service delivery and personnel requirements needed to even maintain existing initiatives, not to talk of adopting them for wider use.

Unfortunately, the current literature on reforms is such that various scholars are firmly entrenched in each of the three ideological camps. However, reformers with real world experience will know these three key approaches are not mutually exclusive. The “big bang” approach is necessary in order to have a reform “movement” that is based on a clear plan. Within this plan, it is important to ensure that reforms are problem-driven, rather than generic, and there is a need to focus on “wicked” problems that are causing blockages in the system. Finally, demonstration projects are important to build confidence that change is indeed possible.

Therefore, rather than undertake more and more pilots that do not teach us anything new, I would argue that Africa should focus on the levers that can bring about its development. Unknown to many Africans, the African Union has developed an agenda for Africa called “Agenda 2063: The Africa we want.” This agenda is a strategic framework for the socio-economic development of Africa over the next 50 years. The Agenda has 7 main aspirations which I will briefly take in turn.

You see, Africa and/or its donors cannot “pilot” itself out of poverty. Therefore, the first aspiration of Agenda 2063 focuses on prosperity, inclusive growth and sustainable development. Africa must produce more. It must trade more. The African market of 1.1 billion people is enough to generate great wealth for the continent, even by just trading with itself.

This leads to the second aspiration which is for an integrated continent that is united on the basis of Pan-Africanism. The European Union, despite Brexit, is one of the world’s most powerful trading blocks. The Asians and the South Americans have similar arrangements. Although southern and western Africa have taken some baby steps in this direction, Africa still does not have a truly integrated continental initiative. It does seem rather odd, for instance, that you can enter South Africa without a visa on a British passport but not on a Nigerian passport.

The third aspiration is good governance, democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law. While these are all important and is an area that donors favour, China and some other Asian countries have shown that you can have development without western-style “good governance.” Therefore, Africa must find what works for Africa in this regard, without constraining human freedoms. Unfortunately, Africa’s history of dictatorship has not had the same track record of “benevolence” as those in Asia. To convincingly argue for any sort of dictatorship as the solution to Africa’s problems is, therefore, a very difficult endeavour.

The fourth aspiration is peace and security. This is a given. Africa cannot grow without peace and security.

The fifth is strong cultural identity, with good values and ethics. Therefore, Africa must eschew harmful traditional practices that constrain its growth.

The sixth is to place people at the centre of its development. Africa has had too much economic growth that is not people-driven and that merely widens the equality gap.

Finally, Africa needs to be a strong, united global partner. The partnership approach is important. Partners are often equals, not donors and beneficiaries. Each partner supports the other for the overall benefit of the partnership enterprise. A poor, dependent Africa is of no benefit to an otherwise prosperous world.

In my opinion, Agenda 2063 provides the levers that can pull Africa out of poverty and into prosperity. Unfortunately, the African Union does not appear to have the convening power to facilitate a continental dialogue that can see this agenda influence the development plans of its constituent members. If this can somehow be done, donors and development partners will know exactly “The Africa We Want” and tailor their interventions accordingly. The era of donor-driven development focused on pilots and demonstration projects will start to wane. Without pulling the necessary levers, pilots will never be able to take off, no matter how many you have.

*Dr Joe Abah is the Director-General of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms, The Presidency, Nigeria, and a Visiting Lecturer at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, The Netherlands.

Courtesy of AfricanLiberty.org

Friday, 24 February 2017

A MUST READ - 'When money finishes, people remain: The challenges of youth unemployment in Nigeria' by @DrJoeAbah

Dr Joe Abah is the Director-General of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms in the Presidency

The need to tackle rising youth unemployment is clear to all. Nigeria needs to develop a coordinated, overarching youth employment policy, approved at the highest level of government, to guide all the interventions.

A few days ago, Mr Bisi Ogunwale, a businessman, reported on Twitter how a young boy had begged him for money at a popular bus stop in Lagos, the bustling commercial capital of Nigeria. When he refused to give the boy any money, the boy is said to have told him: “Remember! When money finishes, it is people that remain.” Mr Ogunwale reported that the statement had had a chilling effect on him and that he was scared and sad at the same time. A short Twitter debate ensued as to the possible meaning of the statement. Some felt that it was an approximation of the quote often attributed to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “When the people shall have nothing more to eat, they will eat the rich.” Others felt that it meant that you should be nice to the poor because if there is a breakdown of law and order, it is the poor people you have been nice to who will save you, the rich. Yet others felt that it was an admonition not to place too high a value on money, but to invest instead in people, particularly the youth. Virtually every commentator agreed that the statement was sufficiently chilling to concern every Nigerian adult.

High youth unemployment
According to its National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), Nigeria has a youth labour force of 38.2 million people. For context, that is a youth workforce (between the ages of 15 and 24 years) that is more than three times the entire population of Belgium. Of this number, 48.7% or 15.2 million (much more than the entire population of Belgium) is out of work and actively seeking employment. The NBS figures include those that are unemployed and seeking work, as well as those that are under-employed. The NBS is careful not to include those that are not working and not looking for work, such as fulltime homemakers.

Several reasons have been advanced for the high rate of youth unemployment in Nigeria. These include high population growth rate (understandably), deficient school curricula and poor teacher orientation, lack of focus on manufacturing as a result of overdependence on the oil sector, and flawed and inconsistent government policies on youth unemployment. These will now be discussed in turn.

It is rather difficult to do anything to reduce Nigeria’s high population growth, particularly as it is tied to religious and cultural sentiments. Family planning campaigns are mostly run by foreign donors, and the cultural reliance on multiple births as a response to previously high infant mortality rates is still in the consciousness of many. There is also some evidence that a large population is not necessarily a bad thing if a country can leverage it as an advantage. Countries with large populations such as China, India, Brazil and Indonesia have made very good developmental progress in the last 50 years.

The school curricula at different levels are neither sufficiently geared towards the needs of employers nor do they equip young people for self-employment. Many young people complete even tertiary education without an ability to apply that knowledge to real life situations. This has led some to conclude that a majority of the youth are ‘unemployable’.

It is expected that the drop in oil prices will lead to a sharper focus on manufacturing and industrialisation, which should, in turn, create additional jobs. If it is true that “oil is over”, then there are likely to be more employment opportunities for young people in agriculture, solid minerals, telecommunications and services, as government and the private sector make efforts to diversify the economy.

Uncoordinated policies towards youth employment
The Federal Government of Nigeria has recently launched a programme called Npower, which is targeted at equipping youth with the skills to make them employable. It aims to help build entrepreneurship skills, facilitate mentoring and skills transfer, and provide internships and contract employment to more than 500,000 young persons.

Virtually every government in Nigeria’s history has created one programme or another in an attempt to tackle youth unemployment. The schemes tend to raise hopes and do indeed benefit some young persons while they last. However, policy inconsistencies mean that successive administrations abandon the initiatives of their predecessors and create new initiatives, often justifying their actions with allegations of corruption against their predecessors and accusations of nepotism in the selection of beneficiaries. This means that it would be difficult to point to a consistent, sustained youth empowerment initiative that can be tracked over time and assessed for impact.

It is also difficult to point to a coordinated youth employment agenda that is shared, understood and subscribed to by all relevant government actors. Different parts of government have different initiatives and ambitions for youth empowerment. The Office of the Vice-president, the Ministry of Youth and Sports, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs and Social Development, the Ministry of Labour and Productivity and the National Directorate of Employment, among others, all have initiatives and schemes focused on youth unemployment. What is lacking is a coordinated, overarching youth employment policy, approved at the highest level of government, that guides all the interventions. Such a policy will foster coordinated strategies which should, in turn, produce sensible activities and initiatives in a measurable way across the whole result chain: input-output-outcome-impact.

The Bureau of Public Service Reforms, which I currently lead, will shortly be developing a policy paper titled “Understanding Youth Unemployment”. The paper will evaluate the effectiveness of current and previous efforts, including the major issue of coordination and an overarching policy and strategy, and propose ways forward.

The need to tackle rising youth unemployment is clear to all. Nigeria is currently in a recession and oil prices have been at their lowest for very many years. As the young boy at the Lagos bus stop said, “When the money finishes, it is people that remain.”


Photo: Street in Lagos Centre. Credits: Zouzou Wizman via Flickr.com.

This article was published in GREAT Insights Volume 6, Issue 1 (February/March 2017).

Friday, 27 January 2017

1st and 2nd Quarter Budget Implementation Reports Made Available For Public Viewing. cc @DrJoeAbah

DG BPSR, Dr Joe Abah with Mr Ben Akabueze, DG Budget

BPSR's monthly Lunchtime Seminar series took place, yesterday Thursday, 26th February 2017. It was the first for the new year.

The theme "Reforms in Budget Office of the Federation" had Mr Ben Akabueze, DG Budget as the guest speaker.

 Before the seminar commenced, Dr Abah in a tweet (as seen below) informed all why the monthly seminar is held.
It was the need to inform and involve the public on current reform initiatives, he went on to say in his address at the seminar. Dr Abah announced that the "List of every single item money was released against is available on request."

Dr Abah also announced that the 1st and 2nd Quarter Budget Implementation Reports for the 2016 Budget can be viewed on the Budget Office website -  http://budgetoffice.gov.ng/

In his address, Mr Akabueze announced that "Nigeria's rate fell by 80.0% from 28.8% of GDP in 2000 to 5.7% of GDP in 2016."

He went on to state that the "key challenges in Budget controls are poor capital expenditure management and late Commencement of procurement"

Visit bpsr.gov.ng website for latest news from BPSR.

You can also follow us on Twitter - @bpsr_ng

The budget reports are available via http://budgetoffice.gov.ng/

Thursday, 26 January 2017

BPSR 2017 Budget Lunchtime Seminar STREAMING LIVE here (http://www.bpsr.gov.ng/) at 12:30pm TODAY. cc @DrJoeAbah

Did you know that the Lunchtime Seminar on the 2017 Budget will be streamed live on today, on 26 Jan from 12:30 pm?

Did you also know that DG Budget, Mr Ben Akabueze, will be the speaker at the Lunchtime Seminar?

Visit http://www.bpsr.gov.ng/ to join host, DG BPSR Dr Joe Abah and Guest speaker DG Budget, Mr Ben Akabueze.


DG BPSR, Dr Joe Abah with DG Budget, Mr Ben Akabueze,

http://www.bpsr.gov.ng/

Wednesday, 25 January 2017

Africa’s problem is planning, not implementation! By @DrJoeAbah. WHAT DO YOU THINK?

Posted below is Director General of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms, Dr Joe Abah's article, published in the blog of Africa Research Institute website.
Director General of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms, Dr Joe Abah

“Success depends upon previous preparation, and without such preparation there is sure to be failure” [Confucius]
Everywhere you go in Africa, you are likely to hear people say “Our problem is not planning, but implementation.” People regale you with various examples of “beautiful plans” that were “technically perfect” but never made it to implementation. Indeed, the refrain “Our problem is not planning but implementation” receives knowing nods of approval from all and sundry and is generally taken as accepted wisdom. It is likely to win you loud ovation at any workshop or seminar in Africa. You could be forgiven for thinking that Africans are born with a deficiency of the implementation gene, if there was such a thing. The statement that planning is not our problem and the notion that Africans are unable to implement are two of the biggest fallacies there are.
 The statement that planning is not our problem and the notion that Africans are unable to implement are two of the biggest fallacies there are.

For donors by donors
Let us start with planning. There are five main types of plan prevalent in Africa. The first type is “donor plans”: plans written for the benefit of donors. Actually, if the truth be told, they are usually plans written by donors for donors in the name of Africans. From Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, to Structural Adjustment Programmes, to Millennium Development Goals, even to the current Sustainable Development Goals – very few of these plans enjoy top-level government ownership or even, in some cases, awareness. There is often no link to government budgets; no consideration of implementation capacity; and no consideration of institutions and politics. Worse still, purist monitoring and evaluation practitioners virtually force people to promise things they know full well will not happen, just so that the logical framework can be technically perfect. Even the few plans that are “costed” are usually costed by people who do not have basic information about government fiscal policies, unit costs, availability of resources or workable sequence. Is it, therefore, any surprise that many of these plans are never implemented? Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?

World peace and goodwill to all
The second type of plan prevalent in Africa is what I would term the “advocacy plan”. These are plans that are intended to be used to put pressure on government to behave in a different way. Most of Africa’s sector plans fall into this category. Sector experts in areas like health and education are rightly passionate about improvements in their field, but are usually blissfully unaware of the pressures on other arms of government. They will write an education or health sector plan which cannot be fully funded even if a country was to spend its entire budget on it to the exclusion of everything else.
When you say to them: “We currently have 100 students to one teacher. Can we first plan to get to 85 students to one teacher over the next two years?” they will say “No! The ‘Education For All’ standard is 30 students to one teacher and we must maintain pressure on government to build more classrooms and engage more teachers.” I approximate with the figures, but you get the gist. When you then ask them where the money should come from to pay for it and still fund security, infrastructure and other priorities, they will usually say that those sectors too should fight for their own resources, as if the resource envelope is endlessly elastic. Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?

God forbid!
The third type of plan is the “Plan A Only” plan. The Twitter profile of one Charles Mwabili says “No Plan B – it distracts Plan A.” Yep! You guessed it. He’s African. We have several versions of this type of plan across Africa. Each is usually preceded by good analysis and has at least made an effort to be realistic. However, there is usually no risk analysis, no risk mitigation and no contingency planning. Any questions such as “What if something were to go wrong?” are often met with no more than “God will not let it happen.” Well, Murphy’s law is that whatever can go wrong will. And God lets earthquakes, tsunamis and famines happen. So, with these plans, the moment something does not happen as planned, or happens out of sequence (as life generally tends to do), the plan is immediately thrown into disarray. If you are lucky, aspects of it will be implemented but usually in a haphazard way. Instead of having a Plan B to build a smaller house, given a fall in revenue, the money for the roof of the planned big house gets cut. It never gets built and ends up as an abandoned project. Is not having a Plan B an implementation problem or a planning problem?

In the eye of the beholder
 The “beautiful plan” looks technically perfect and ticks all the boxes, but is completely unrealistic.
The fourth type of plan is the “beautiful plan”. This type of plan looks technically perfect and ticks all the boxes, but is completely unrealistic. It is hailed as the answer to all Africa’s problems and is the type of plan that evokes the most anger when it is not implemented. It plans to pave every street with gold, in a country that has no gold and no money to buy any. The beautiful plan will give everybody an immediate 1000% percent pay rise. It will turn the worst slums into Dubai or Singapore overnight, of course without the need for an autocratic ruler and other institutional conditions. It pretends that politics does not exist, that people do not have self-interest and that everyone’s priorities are uniform. Sometimes, the plan is prepared on a ceteris paribus – all other things being equal – basis and assumes that all projected revenue will come in, all budgeted funds will be fully released, and that the required human resource capacity and capability already exist in abundance. Indeed, it assumes that the common sense of it all should be so blindingly obvious that the plan should just deliver itself. After all, it has happened exactly as planned in other countries. Sorry to bastardise the phrase but ceteris is never paribus, particularly in Africa. Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?

The fire brigade
The fifth type of plan is, of course, the “fire brigade plan.” This is the type that was written only to facilitate the theft of public funds from donors or the government itself. It is usually cobbled together shoddily and quickly at the eleventh hour, and only a little intellectual prodding is sufficient to expose its soft underbelly. Fire brigade plans see African countries unable to cater for their athletes during Olympic Games and World Cups. Although we have four years notice that these events will happen, we do not start to plan for them until a few months before the start date. There is little or no preparation, arrangements to take care of athletes at host cities are shoddy, and their allowances are not paid or have been misappropriated. In truth, it would appear that there was never at any time an intention that what was planned would be implemented. Do we have an implementation problem or a planning problem?

The good plan
 A good plan will have a deep understanding of political economy: the way it is, not the way it ought to be.
A good plan is a plan that has a good chance of getting delivered. A plan that has no chance of getting delivered is a bad plan. There is, therefore, no such thing as a “beautiful plan” that does not get delivered. “Beautiful plans” are bad plans. A good plan will factor in resources (human and financial), in a realistic manner based on historical patterns. It will not be based on the pipe dream that internally generated revenue will somehow magically double overnight. Funds for Year 1 will not be based on income from a mining programme that hasn’t even been commissioned, let alone being at break even or making profit. A good plan will have a deep understanding of political economy: the way it is, not the way it ought to be. It will have a best case, middle case, and worst case scenario, based on realistic projections for policy, personnel and funds. It will identify a number of quick wins that are virtually cost-free to buy support and build confidence. Finally, a good plan will have an implementation plan that factors in all the risks to its own implementation! This will include rigorous analysis of risks that accepts some of the risks as unmanageable “show-stoppers”, but also identifies those that can be managed and mitigated (and sets out clear steps for doing so). How many of Africa’s plans are good plans?

The implementation gene
Let us now come to implementation. Are Africans born deficient of an “implementation gene”? Of course not; Africans can implement as well as everyone else. However, there is a science to implementation. One of the foremost advocates of what he calls “deliverology” is Sir Michael Barber, author of the book Instruction To Deliver. In essence, he talks about the need to set clear priorities and measurable goals, use data and trajectories to drive progress, build routines around priorities, focus on solving problems and build relentless persistence in tracking the priorities. He also suggests setting up a dedicated unit to manage delivery. Africans are quick to set up units and a number of countries have already set up delivery units. The extent to which these can function without better planning remains to be seen. Barber’s approach is actually not that difficult to follow, particularly if there is a plan and the political will to implement that plan. Often, the basic plan is missing.
Of course, corruption is an impediment to implementation, as are capacity constraints, politics, funding, geography, ethnicity and religion. I must give religion a special mention as a major impediment to implementation in Africa, given the number of tasks that we should ordinarily perform but would rather delegate upwards to God. In my view, it is possible to blame the high level of religiousness in Africa for a lot of the weak risk management. However, none of these is as big an impediment as poor planning and an absence of preparation. Why would God not let us fail at the Olympics if we are busy wrangling over ethnic issues when others are busy preparing for the Games?

Ready, steady, go!
The Jamaican sprinter Usain Bolt made GBP£5 million per second at the 2016 Rio Olympics. Let that sink in, please. PER SECOND! But here’s what is important: in order to achieve that level of income he lifted weights for four hours every day and practised his sprinting every day for 15 years, BEFORE he arrived in Rio. He was not punishing himself in training in order to please donors. He was not punishing himself in order to make anyone else perform differently. As he prepared to be a sprinter, he also readied himself to be a footballer or a cricketer, in case he did not make it at sprinting. The good thing about sports is that it makes you be true to yourself. Your success as a competitor will often depend on whether or not you can overcome your own limitations. In the world of sports, you cannot have a “beautiful plan” to run the 100 metres in under 10 seconds within six months when your weak knees mean that you have never even walked 10 metres in your life without pain, and probably never will. Finally, Usain Bolt did not start preparing for Rio three months before the Games – he started 15 years ago. That is why he never had an implementation problem in Rio.
If we are going to get better at implementation, Africa really must get better at planning and preparation. Of course, Usain Bolt is also blessed with great natural attributes – but Africa is blessed with even more.
Dr Joe Abah is Director-General of the Bureau of Public Service Reforms, The Presidency, Nigeria, and a Visiting Lecturer at the Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University, The Netherlands.

http://www.africaresearchinstitute.org/